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Do health care providers have an explicit or implied right of ac-
tion to sue third party payors under state prompt pay laws for payment
of claims?
The early years of the twenty-first century can be characterized as
the period in which health care providers' attempted to regain control
over claims reimbursement practices. Control over claims payment
slowly was lost during the latter half of the twentieth century with the
rise of third party payors, and the influence of third party payors in the
physician-patient relationship.2 The most prevalent examples of third
party payors are insurance companies and health maintenance organi-
zations.3 By supporting a dramatic increase in the passage of legisla-
* J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Jan. 2005; M.P.H.,
Case Western Reserve University, Jan. 2005.
1 For the purposes of this paper, "providers" will consist of entities that
provide health care services, namely physicians, physician groups, and hospitals.
2 In a 2003 article, Anish P. Michael states:
[t]he development of health insurance gave rise to managed care in the
United States .... [Mianaged care transitioned from fee-for-service pay-
ment directly from consumers to a capitated system [whereby] ... health
care providers are paid a fixed amount to treat individual patients despite
the amount of services given... [and where the managed care organization
can] review ... the care demanded by patients and providers.
Anish P. Michael, Putting Health Care Providers at a Loss and Consumers at Risk:
Why HMOs Should Be Held Accountable for the Financial Instability of Their Dele-
gated Networks, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 169, 175 (2003).
3 A health maintenance organization is "an entity that provides, offers, or
arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a
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tion requiring specific third party health care payors to pay providers
on a timely basis, providers began to assert collective power in an
attempt to regulate payment policies and practices of third party pay-
ors. Prompt pay laws typically require payors to pay clean claims4
within ten days to two months. Additionally, some prompt pay laws
require payors to inform providers of a possible claim deficiency5
that would result in a delayed payment or no payment within the
time specified by statute; otherwise, the claim would be considered
valid..
Currently, two fundamental problems exist with prompt pay stat-
utes.6 First, do prompt pay statutes grant providers an implied or an
explicit right of action? Second, what is a clean claim? Although the
focus of this paper is to determine whether a right of action exists or
should exist, the definition of a clean claim will be explored. Because
prompt pay laws are new, legal issues concerning who can and who
should be able to enforce their provisions have yet to be settled.
Prompt pay laws were passed to ensure that payors reimburse provid-
ers according to a statutory time frame. However, uncertainty exists
concerning whether these laws are capable of rectifying the problems
for which they were created, such as when payors lose claims, repeat-
edly request the same information, request information after dead-
lines, and request unnecessary or unreasonable information.7
fixed, prepaid premium." Id. at 176. Individuals who are members of a health main-
tenance organization or an insurance company are termed the beneficiaries of the
health maintenance organization or the insurance company, and these individuals are
termed patients regarding their relationship with a health care provider.
4 See discussion infra p. 25.
5 A deficiency in a claim occurs when data required to process the claim for
payment is not provided with the claim, such as a specific billing code or the patient's
name. Controversy exists concerning the definition of a deficiency and whether man-
aged care entities are allowed to require specific information which is not usual or
customary. Usual or customary information includes identifying patient information
such as name, date of birth, social security number, and medical services rendered.
Currently, some legislatures are in the process of regulating what information must be
provided by providers when submitting claims and regulating how managed care
entities must publish their requirements for claim processing.
6 Robert W. McCann, State Legislatures Weigh In on Behalf of Providers,
MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 17 ("[P]roviders in almost
every state have complained that existing laws are ineffectual because of vague stan-
dards for clean claims ... inadequate penalties and cumbersome enforcement proce-
dures.").
7 See William S. Hammond, Getting Paid Gets Easier for Michigan's
Health Care Providers, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2002, at 24, 25:
[Numerous factors have combined in recent years to make it more difficult
for health care providers to realize payment from third-party payors on a
timely basis. These factors include the administrative burden of complying
with various third-party payor claims procedures, the absence of effective
[Vol. 15:205
PROMPT PAY STATUTES
Providers and payors disagree over whether payment policies im-
pact quality of care, cost of health care, and access to health care.
Payors contend that payment policies are not problematic because
most bills are paid timely and that sufficient legislation governing
when and how to pay bills exists.8 However, providers maintain that
although some prompt pay laws exist, they are inadequate in alleviat-
ing and rectifying the problems surrounding payment timeframe.
Providers argue that without being able to enforce prompt payment of
claims, patient care is adversely impacted, as providers financially
cannot provide care to patients if the cost of that care is not reim-
bursed in a timely fashion.9 Currently, a vast majority of states have
enacted prompt pay legislation mandating that managed care organi-
zations pay clean claims within a specified time, typically ranging
from fourteen to sixty days, and that managed care organizations in-
form providers of specific reasons for which a particular claim is ei-
ther questioned, delayed, or denied.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether providers
should or already do have a private right of action to initiate claims
under state prompt pay laws. Although many states have enacted
these laws, it is unclear in many cases whether providers have stand-
ing to sue payors for violations of these laws or whether the sole en-
forcement mechanism is the individual states' insurance commission-
ers. Thus far, two courts have dealt squarely with the issue of whether
providers have a private right of action and have reached inconsistent
conclusions.' 0 In addition, this paper will explore the ability of pro-
prompt payment laws, the lack of enforcement of such laws when they do
exist, and the impracticality of litigating payment disputes on a claim-by-
claim basis. These factors, combined with providers' general level of frus-
tration with third-party payor payment practices, has resulted in a number of
high profile class action lawsuits against numerous third-party payors alleg-
ing prompt pay violations.
(citation omitted).
8 Wayne J. Guglielmo, Will the States Cook up a Health Care Fix? Faced
with Budget Gaps, a Medicaid Squeeze, and Ballooning Liability Premiums, State
Lawmakers Struggle to do More with Less. MED. EcON., Jul. 12, 2002, at 38, 38:
That ongoing concern strikes some in the managed care industry as exces-
sive. "I know there's some frustration [among providers], but, legislatively,
I think this is an area that has been well covered[]" says Susan Laudicina,
who tracks state health care policy for the Blue Cross Blue Shield Associa-
tion's Washington, DC, office.
9 HMO Pays More Than $100,000 Fine for Payment Violation, HEALTH &
MED. WK., Aug. 4, 2003, at 561.
10 See Solomon v. United States Healthcare Sys. of Pa., 797 A.2d 346 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that providers do not have a right of action to sue as the
legislature did not indicate an intent to create a private cause of action); Grider v.
Keystone Health Plan, No. 2001-CV-05641, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16551, at *25
2005]
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viders to initiate and sustain causes of breach of contractual obliga-
tions, whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)" preempts provider claims against third party payors for
failing to pay timely, and whether provider advocates - i.e., profes-
sional associations - can or should be able to initiate suits on behalf of
their constituents. Lastly, this paper will explore the practicality of
placing responsibility for enforcement of prompt pay statutes with
state insurance commissioners through administrative actions in the
context of cost to the health care industry, the incentives to payors to
follow prompt pay statutes, and the likelihood that insurance commis-
sioners will enforce these statutes.
A BRIEF GLIMPSE AT THE IMPACT OF DELINQUENT
PAYMENTS
Late payments severely affect the financial stability of health care
providers, including individual physician practices, group practices,
and hospitals. For example, in California approximately 115 physi-
cian groups declared bankruptcy between 1997 and 1999, many due to
late payments that prevented the providers from covering their over-
head expenses and the direct cost of patient care. 12 The plight of
health care providers in California was so severe during this period
that the New England Journal of Medicine published a review which
came to the conclusion that physician groups in California "were en-
gaged in a 'Darwinian struggle for survival,' where success depended
on 'avoiding the high-cost patients who need [them] most.' '  In
California, the impact of provider bankruptcies "caused disruption [in
(E.D. Penn. Sept. 18, 2003) (holding that providers do have a private right of action
because to determine otherwise would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). For more on ERISA, see infra text p. 12.
12 Brant S. Mittler & Andrd Hampton, The Princess and the Pea: The Assur-
ance of Voluntary Compliance Between the Texas Attorney General and Aetna's
Texas HMOs and Its Impact on Financial Risk Shifting by Managed Care, 83 B.U. L.
Rev. 553, 564 (2003). See also Michael, supra note 2, at 190-91:
Many of these delegated networks are caught in the middle of a health care
plan originated by the HMO and agreed upon by the enrollee.... If there is
any delay by the HMO to pay set capitation fees, the delegated network is
unable to make payment claims. In turn, the delegated entity is liable for
violating the prompt pay laws .... Providers have trouble continuing to op-
erate when claims are paid untimely. In addition, providers that are at odds
with a particular HMO or delegated network are forced to run away enrol-
lees since payment is unlikely. Even with a delegated network filing bank-
ruptcy, the provider will never see the actual amount of the claims filed and
must settle for the best possible payout.
(citations omitted).
13 Mittler, supra note 12, at 564.
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continuation of medical care] and confusion [about where to seek
medical care] for 2.5 million California HMO enrollees."' 14 California
was not alone during this period. The Medical Society of New Jersey
estimated in 2001 that the impact of unpaid bills due to insurance de-
lays totaled one billion dollars annually to providers within New Jer-
sey.1
5
The billing and collection system of the health care industry is
unique to the industry. Third party payors frequently employ a
scheme whereby these organizations contract with an intermediary
organization that promises to pay the health care costs for the benefi-
ciaries of the health plans offered by the third party payor. 16 Third
party payors contract with the intermediary organization in an attempt
to limit the specific dollar amount of health care spending for a spe-
cific population, regardless of the actual needs of that population.'
7
Consequently, the intermediary organization frequently finds that it is
expending greater quantities of money in health care costs than the
reimbursement total received from the third party payor.18 Thus, de-
lays and denials in payments to providers increase considerably.' 9
This constitutes a financial risk-shifting scheme whereby third party
payors shift the financial burden to these intermediary groups. 20 Ul-
timately, this risk-shifting scheme impacts patient care, quality of
care, and the physician-patient relationship. 2' The physician-patient
relationship no longer functions solely between the physician and the
patient, as intermediary parties become involved in medical decision-
making, frequently determining the necessity of health care services,
through economic decisions involving utilization review,2 2 economic
14 Id.
15 Eve Tahmincioglu, Is Your Health Insurance Hurting Your Credit?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2002, § 3, at 8 ("Unpaid bills can add up quickly. In New Jersey
alone, about $1 billion in claims go unpaid annually because of insurance delays,
according to a survey conducted last year by the Medical Society of New Jersey.").
16 See Michael, supra note 2, at 181 ("A delegated network is an entity au-





20 Mittler, supra note 12, at 555 ("MCOs accomplish financial risk shifting
either through direct contracts with individual physicians or by contracts with inter-
mediaryphysician groups."). See also Michael, supra note 2, at 180-81.
I See Mittler, supra note 12, at 557 ("It is the relationship between the
downstream entity and the individual physicians that ultimately affects patient care,
the doctor-patient relationship, and the quality of care.").
22 Utilization review is a tool used by managed care entities to monitor the
treatment practices of providers to ensure that providers are not offering more ser-
vices than the managed care entity determines necessary.
20051
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credentialing, 23 pre-authorization, 24 and post-authorization. 25  In re-
sponse to the significant impact of the relationship between third party
payors and intermediary financial risk bearing parties, specifically in
California, New Jersey, and Texas, "the regulatory community
throughout the United States has made the regulation of downstream
entities its number one priority. 26
Health care consumers retain some measure of protection, as
most states have enacted prompt pay statutes regulating the time
frame that an insurance company may legally use to determine
whether to make a payment, question a claim, or deny a claim.2' The
time frame typically is between thirty and sixty days; however, health
care experts argue that time frames alone are insufficient to correct the
problems concerning payment of claims and as a result advocate for
more forceful regulation.28 Consequently, many states have revisited
their prompt pay statutes to increase the forcefulness of the statute for
violations and to clarify terms and definitions. 9
23 Economic credentialing is defined by the American Medical Association
as "the use of economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional compe-
tence in determining a physician's qualifications for initial or continuing hospital
medical staff membership or privileges." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Eco-
nomic Credentialing (AMA Policy H-230.975) available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/10919.html (last modified on December 30, 2003).
24 Pre-authorization is a mechanism whereby managed care entities require
providers to request approval to render health care services prior to rendering those
services in order to receive reimbursement.
25 Post-authorization is similar to pre-authorization, except that the authori-
zation for services occurs after the medical care has been rendered.
26 Mittler, supra note 12, at 584-85:
[i]n recent litigation filed against PacifiCare of Texas, Inc., in February
2002, the OAG has returned to the theme of ultimate financial responsibility
for the licensed HMO. The lawsuit seeks to hold the HMO financially re-
sponsible for the failure of its downstream entities to fulfill the require-
ments of Texas prompt-pay statutes. In this lawsuit, the OAG asserts that
the HMO is 'statutorily prohibited from contractually relieving itself of
regulatory responsibility for.., delegated functions' and may not contrac-
tually relieve itself of its responsibility to promptly pay claims in compli-
ance with Texas statutes and regulations.
Id. (citations omitted).
27 Tahmincioglu, supra note 15, at 8.
28 Id.
29 For example,
[d]octors have done better in their fight to get clean claims paid in a timely
manner: 46 states now have prompt-pay laws on the books, although they
vary widely in their effectiveness. For this reason, lawmakers in Colorado,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, and Virginia have gone back and
tinkered, adding teeth to weak provisions, clarifying muddled ones, and
mandating shorter waits for claims submitted electronically.
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 38. Further "[a] few states are rewriting their laws to
[Vol, 15:205
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The insurance industry views this legislation as an affront to their
field and as a personal attack on its integrity. For example, insurers
assert that provider billing errors and lateness in failing claims in con-
junction with a lack of uniform paperwork is a primary source of re-
imbursement problems. 30  According to Karen Ignagni, president of
the American Association of Health Plans, a managed-care lobbying
group, "[a]ll providers need to move from paper to electronic billing
systems if claims are to be paid immediately."
31
However, providers are battling to remain solvent by initiating
suits alleging extortion and fraud in violation of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, (RICO),32 alleging breaches of
contract, violations of fiduciary duty, and violations of federal and
state prompt pay statutes in hopes that courts will hold insurers re-
sponsible.33
In some states, the threat of legal action against managed care or-
ganizations has been sufficient to effect positive change within the
payment policies and practices of managed care organizations. New
Mexico has implemented positive changes in payment practices with
prompt pay legislation. According to New Mexico Medical Society
Executive Director G. Randy Marshall, "[a] year ago physicians were
being paid in excess of 180 days ... [a]nd now, on average, they are
getting paid within 14 to 25 days, so the law has greatly improved
things. 34 However, in many states because of lack of enforcement of
existing laws and confusion over whether providers do or do not have
a right of action pursuant to prompt pay legislation, managed care
organizations have been slow to make changes within their payment
policies. Consequently, providers should have a right of action to sue
include tougher provisions. New Jersey, for example, recently revised its law man-
dating that electronic claims that are "clean," or clearly covered by insurance, be paid
within 30 days and clean paper claims within 40 days; under its old law, clean claims
had to be paid within 60 days." Tahmincioglu, supra note 15, at 8.
30 Tahmincioglu, supra note 15, at 8.
31 Id.
32 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
33 For instance,
[a] massive lawsuit aims to change all that. The action was bought by a
consortium of high-powered attorneys last year on behalf of the nation's
600,000 doctors. In the suit-which is being heard in the federal district
court in Miami-the California, Texas, and Georgia medical associations,
the Denton County Medical Society (Texas), and 20 individual doctors ac-
cuse many of the nation's largest for-profit HMOs of using extortion and
fraud to systematically steal from them in violation of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Neil Chesanow, Will Managed Care Die in Court?, MED. ECON., Sept. 3, 2001, at 30.
34 Wayne J. Guglielmo, Prompt-pay Laws Are Finally Getting Teeth, MED.
ECON., Jan. 22, 2001, at 47, 52.
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managed care organizations for late or no payment in violation of
their respective state prompt pay statute.
DOES ERISA PREEMPT PROVIDERS FROM
BRINGING STATE LAW CLAIMS?
Managed care organizations and other defendants to suits alleging
breach of contract claims, violations of RICO, and violations of state
prompt pay statutes are likely to move for dismissal of the case argu-
ing that the claims are preempted by ERISA. ERISA was enacted to
protect employees from mismanagement and abuse of employer spon-
sored pension plans. 35 ERISA has evolved through continued legisla-
tive efforts to include regulation of welfare benefit plans including
medical and hospital benefits. 36 Sections 502 and 514 of ERISA pre-
empt state laws that challenge denial of benefits under an ERISA plan
and "relate to" ERISA plans in an attempt to control the plan design.
If an employer directly manages a welfare benefit plan, or hires a
managed care organization to manage the welfare benefit plan, the
plan most likely will be classified as an ERISA plan and is not sub-
ject to state regulation.38 Therefore, pursuant to §§ 502 and 514, these
entities will argue that the suits alleging violation of state law are pre-
empted by federal law.
However, not every issue involving managed care organizations
falls under ERISA preemption. In In re Managed Care Litigation, a
Florida district court determined that "ERISA applies to any employee
benefit plan, provided that it is established or maintained by an em-
ployer or employee organization engaged in commerce or in any in-
dustry or activity affecting commerce., 39 In determining whether a
particular claim is preempted, courts must address the preliminary
question of whether the provider's claim against the managed care
organization is a direct cause of action or whether it is consequent to a
patient's cause of action.40 If the claim is independent of a patient's
cause of action, then the claim is not preempted by ERISA; however,
35 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., HISTORY OF
EBSA AND ERISA, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history/html (last
visited on February 29, 2004).
36 Id.
37 Michael J. Jackonis, Jr., Considerations in Medicare Reform: The Impact
of Medicare Preemption on State Laws, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 197 (2004).
38 "States generally cannot directly regulate private employer-sponsored
health plans, mandate that employers even offer or pay for health insurance, tax pri-
vate employer-sponsored health plans, or indirectly affect employer-sponsored health
plans by imposing substantial costs on plans." Id. at 198.
39 135 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 (S.D. Fla., 2001).
40 Id. at 1267-68.
(Vol. 15:205
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if it is consequential to a patient's cause of action, then ERISA ap-
plies.4 1 Two types of contracts extend from ERISA plans. The first
contract is between the plan and a patient which informs the patient as
to what care the patient is entitled to receive under the plan. The sec-
ond contract is between the plan and the provider and sets forth what
medical care the provider is responsible for providing to the patients
of the ERISA plan and the reimbursement rates for that care. Provid-
ers cannot bring causes of action alleging that ERISA plans violated
the contract between the plan and the patient by denying care to the
patient. Providers can only bring claims alleging that the plan failed
to abide by the contract between the plan and the provider, essentially
alleging that the plan failed to reimburse the provider for medical care
provided.
In In re Managed Care Litigation, the court ruled that the plain-
tiff's claims alleging bundling 42 and downcoding 43 by the defendants
were not preempted by ERISA as the state law contract claims did not
"relate to" the ERISA plans and could be analyzed as a breach of con-
tract claim without the need to interpret or refer to ERISA.44 In the
context of prompt pay claims, the plaintiffs alleged that managed care
organizations were violating state prompt pay laws by failing to sub-
mit payment for provided medical care within the statutory time
frame. The plaintiffs did not allege a cause of action derivative to a
patient's cause of action. In other words, the plaintiffs did not allege
that the managed care entity violated the contractual provisions be-
tween the managed care organization and its beneficiaries by denial of
care that was specifically provided for in the contract. The plaintiffs
alleged that the managed care organization failed to reimburse provid-
ers for services rendered to patients pursuant to the contractual rela-
tionship (either explicit or implied) between the managed care organi-
zation and the provider, not pursuant to the contract between the pa-
tient and the managed care organization. In other words, a provider
will agree to provide medical care for the managed care organization's
enrollees in consideration for timely and appropriate reimbursement
from the managed care organization. Prompt pay claims do not allege
that managed care organizations fail to follow their individual con-
tracts with their beneficiaries. The Ninth Circuit has found that causes
41 D. Brian Hufford, Managed Care Litigation: The Role of Providers, in
HEALTH CARE LITIGATION: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW AFTER PEGRAM, at 487, 499
(PLI Corp. L. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1216, 2000).
42 Bundling occurs when a payor combines several claims and remits one
payment for those claims.
43 Downcoding occurs when a payor changes the coding of a claim such that
the value of the claim decreases.
44 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
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of action that cannot be sustained by beneficiaries because the actions
ensue from the agreement between the provider and the managed care
organization for payment, and not from ERISA plan benefits, are not
preempted by ERISA.45 Therefore, so long as providers' claims are
asserting enforcement of contracts, ERISA preemption should not be
46at issue.
Lawsuits against managed care organizations which happen to be
classified as ERISA plans alleging violation of state law claims "such
as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an
ERISA plan - are relatively commonplace. 'A 7 In Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Service, Inc., both the petitioners and the United
States as amicus curiae admitted that ERISA § 514(a) did not preempt
suits alleging violations of common place state law claims even
though these claims impacted ERISA plans and their beneficiaries. 8
If providers sue payors because they are not being reimbursed accord-
ing to their contracts, then the providers are suing as creditors and not
on behalf of their patients.49
In Baylor University Medical Center (BUMC) v. Arkansas Blue
Cross Blue Shield (ABCBS), BUMC sued ABCBS for breach of con-
tract and for late payments of claims pursuant to Texas Insurance
Code Annotated art. 3.70-3C, §3A.50 BUMC and ABCBS had entered
into a contract whereby BUMC would provide medical services to
ABCBS beneficiaries. 51 BUMC provided medical services to an
ABCBS beneficiary and submitted a clean claim to ABCBS that was
partially reimbursed after the statutory time requirements of the Texas
Prompt Pay Statute.5 2 ABCBS removed the suit to federal court alleg-
ing ERISA preemption; however, the district court ruled that removal
was improper as ERISA did not preempt BUMC's claims.53 The
court stated that preemption of state law claims occurs when "(1) the
state law claim addresses areas of exclusive federal concern, and (2)
the claim directly affects the relationship between traditional ERISA
entities - the employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the partici-
pants and beneficiaries. 54 In this case, the court found that enforcing
45 See Hufford, supra note 41, at 498.
46 See id.
47 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833
(1988).
48 Id.
49 Hufford, supra note 41, at 498.
50 331 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504, 511 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
"' Id. at 504-05.
52 Id. at 505.
13 Id. at 505, 512.
14 Id. at 507.
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contracts was not an area of exclusive federal concern and that requir-
ing payment within a state's statutory time frame did not impede the
relationship between an ERISA plan and its beneficiaries. 5
If providers were barred from suing for enforcement of their con-
tracts with ERISA benefit plans, this "preemption of provider contract
claims would 'defeat rather than promote' ERISA's goal to 'protect
the interests of employees and beneficiaries covered by benefit
plans.' ' 56 Providers cannot afford to contract with organizations that
would be exempt from contract enforcement, as providers then would
be providing health care without any assurance of appropriate and
timely reimbursement. The aforementioned consequence defeats
ERISA's goal as the availability of, and access to health care would
be severely restricted by reduction in the numbers of providers willing
to provide health care to beneficiaries of ERISA benefit plans. With-
out guarantee of timely and appropriate reimbursement, providers
would be unlikely to voluntarily treat beneficiaries of ERISA plans.
Moreover, health care providers do not lie within the scope of
ERISA 57 and do not participate in the bargain 58 in which limitations
on the right to sue are accepted in exchange for ERISA's protections.
The decision in In re Managed Care Litigation held that ERISA pre-
emption does not bar providers from bringing contract claims.
59
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT
OF ACTION PURSUANT TO PROMPT PAY STATUTES
Providers should have a private right of action to initiate suit
against a payor for failure to pay claims within the time frame estab-
lished by a state's legislature, even if the state's prompt pay statute
does not explicitly grant such a right. As discussed in the next sec-
" Id. at 509, 511-12.
56 In re Managed Care Litigation, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1268 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
17 Id. at 1268.
58 Hufford, supra note 41, at 499.
59 In re Managed Care Litigation, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. See also Huf-
ford, supra note 41, at 497:
[t]o combat the breach of contract claims by providers, managed care de-
fendants may argue that the claims are preempted under ERISA, in that they
"relate to" ERISA plans, such that the compensatory damages sought by the
providers would be precluded. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248,
255 (1993) (ERISA only permits "appropriate equitable relief," not com-
pensatory damages, which is "the classic form of legal relief"). While such
a defense has repeatedly been asserted in actions brought by individual pro-
viders, however, it appears to be unsuccessful, so long as the provider is




tion, providers can sue payors under contractual principles; however,
whether providers can sustain a cause of action against payors under
newly created state prompt pay legislation is not yet settled. To date,
only two courts have directly addressed this issue.
60
The Solomon v. Aetna Case
In Solomon v. United States Healthcare System of Pennsylvania,
Dr. Mark Solomon and Aetna, Inc. (Aetna) entered into an agreement
whereby Solomon would provide specified health care services to the
61beneficiaries of Aetna's health care policies. In return, Aetna would
reimburse Solomon for the services rendered according to the pre-
specified rate structure. 62 In order for Solomon to see and treat a sub-
scriber, the subscriber first would have to receive pre-certification
from his primary care physician.63 Solomon initiated a suit against
Aetna claming that Aetna failed to make payments for services ren-
dered according to their contractual arrangements. 64 Solomon alleged
"breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud, conversion, and negligent mis-
representation., 65 However, the trial court dismissed all the counts
except breach of contract. 66 Thereafter, Solomon amended the com-
plaint to include a claim alleging violation of Pennsylvania's Prompt
Pay statute, the Pennsylvania Quality Health Care Accountability and
Protection Act (Health Care Act).67 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Solomon determined that providers do not have a right of action
because the Pennsylvania Legislature did not indicate an intent to cre-
ate a private right of action in the drafting of the legislation nor would
allowing the suit be consistent with the purpose of the legislation even
though providers constitute the class for which the statute was created.
The Solomon Court used the three element test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash to determine whether or
not a plaintiff has standing to initiate a suit.68 First, the plaintiff must
60 Solomon v. United States Healthcare Sys. of Pa., 797 A.2d 346 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002); Grider v. Keystone Health Plan, No. 2001-CV-05641, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16551 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 18, 2003).






67 Solomon, 797 A.2d at 348.; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 991.2101-.2166
(West 1999).
68 Solomon, 797 A.2d at 352, citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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be a member of a class for which the legislation was created. 69 Sec-
ond, the legislation must indicate an intention to create or deny a rem-
edy to this particular class. 70 Third, allowing a plaintiff to bring suit
must be consistent with the purpose of the legislation.7 The Solomon
court, found that the first element of the Cort test was met, but that the
second and third factors were not satisfied.72 In Solomon, the court
stated,
[o]ur review of the Act reveals no indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, to create a private remedy .... More-
over, the regulations promulgated under the Health Care Act
evidence a strong indication that no private cause of action
exists. Instead, the regulations provide an administrative pro-
cedure for a health care provider to file a complaint with the
Insurance Department.73
However, whether the administrative remedy provided by the
Health Care Act is effective in ensuring that managed care entities pay
providers according to the requirements outlined in the Act is ques-
tionable, especially in light of the fact that to date no managed care
entities have been fined in Pennsylvania.74 The Solomon court stated
that they were unaware of any intent to create a private remedy for
providers to initiate causes of action pursuant to the Health Care
Act. 75 What is the purpose of codifying a rule without a right of ac-
tion, implied or explicit, that enables the aggrieved party to seek re-
imbursement? In and of itself, the legislation indicates an intent by
the General Assembly to force managed care entities to reimburse
76providers within forty-five days.
The Solomon court erred in requiring specific oral or written evi-
dence of legislative intent to create a private right of action; the sec-
ond element of the Cort test should have been found to exist. Addi-
tionally, the Solomon court incorrectly applied the third element of the
Cort test. The third element analyzes whether creating a private right
of action which would allow a provider to bring a cause of action




72 Id. at 352-53.
73 id.
74 See Appendix infra p. 233.
75 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 991.2166 (West 1999) (the legislature requires




tion exists to force managed care entities to timely reimburse provid-
ers for services rendered. Allowing providers to sue managed care
entities which fail to meet the statutory requirements would reflect the
spirit of the legislation.
The Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Case
The decision by the Solomon court barring a private right of ac-
tion was criticized by the federal district court in Grider v. Keystone
Health Plan.77 The district court held that providers have a private
right of action pursuant to the Health Care Act.78 In the Grider case,
Dr. Grider and her affiliates provided approximately 4,000 patients
with medical services. 79 These patients were primarily insured by
defendant Keystone Health Plan Central (Keystone), organized under
the Pennsylvania Health Maintenance Organization Act.80 Grider and
Keystone entered into an HMO-physician agreement whereby Grider
would provide medical services to Keystone enrollees in return for
payment. 81 Grider alleged numerous federal claims and two state
claims: violation of the prompt payment provision of the Health Care
Act and breach of an implied contractual duty of good faith and fair
dealing.82
The Grider court determined that the first and third elements of
the Cort test for standing were met: i.e., that the plaintiffs were mem-
bers of a special class for which the legislation was created and that
implying a private cause of action was consistent with the underlying
purpose of the statute.83 In contrast to the Solomon Court, the Grider
court applied the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act of 197284
to determine how to analyze the second prong of the Cort test.85 Pur-
suant to § 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, the intent of the
General Assembly may be ascertained when a statute is not explicit by
reviewing "the mischief to be remedied, the object to be obtained and
the consequences of a particular interpretation.' 86 The Grider court
states that even though the legislative history does not indicate an
intent to provide a private right of action, "a private cause of action
77 Grider v. Keystone Health Plan, No. 2001-CV-05641, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16551, at *86 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 18, 2003).
78 Id. at *102.
79 Id. at *4.
80 Id.
81 Id. at *5.
82 Id. at *8.
83 Grider, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16551 at *83-86.
84 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 1995).
85 Grider, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16551 at *86-95.
86 Id. at *92.
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should be implied because failure to do so would be absurd and would
neither further the object of the statute nor remedy the mischief."87
Without a private right of action under the Pennsylvania statute, pro-
viders have no remedy to enforce the statute against alleged violators.
The statute does not authorize the insurance commissioner to force the
payors to make timely payments, to force payors to pay delinquent
payments, or to force payors to pay interest on delinquent payments.
88
The statute solely authorizes the insurance commissioner to impose a
nominal fine to be paid to the Department of Insurance for violations
of the statute, this penalty does not aid providers.8 9 Consequently,
what would be the point of the prompt pay statute and why would the
Pennsylvania General Assembly have passed the statute if the statute
was in effect not enforceable?
To date, the vast majority of state insurance commissions have
been wholly ineffective in enforcing state prompt pay statutes. When
the Michigan Legislature passed a prompt pay bill in late 2000, Gov-
ernor John Engler vetoed the bill.9° He explained to the Michigan
Senate that he supported requiring timely payment of healthcare
claims, but that he did not support the legislation because he did not
want the insurance commissioner to act as a bill collector or an arbiter
over disputed claims between physicians and payors. 91  Placing the
enforcement of prompt pay laws within the responsibility of a state
insurance commissioner is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the
legislation. Insurance commissioners are unlikely to fine and force
third party payors to pay providers for the claim plus interest until a
sufficiently large number of providers or a significantly large sum of
money is at issue. Michigan Insurance Commissioner Frank Fitzger-
ald compared the Michigan legislation with New York's prompt pay
law, which has been backlogged with administrative cases. 92 Conse-
quently, Commissioner Fitzgerald estimated that to enforce the legis-
lation and expected caseload in Michigan, he would need to increase
the size of his department by approximately one-fifth of its current
size.93 After these statements were made in Michigan, prompt pay
legislation was passed that enabled the Commissioner of the Office of
Financial and Insurance Services to fine a violator up to $1000 per
87 Id. at *94.
18 Id. at *90.
'9 Id. at *92.90 Neil Versel, Prompt Pay Delay: Advocates Renew Push after Michigan






violation or $10,000 for multiple violations.94 However, the legisla-
tion does not bar a complainant from bringing a lawsuit nor is filing
an administrative complaint a necessary pre-condition to filing a law-
suit.
95
In Illinois, the Department of Insurance has yet to issue a fine
against a payor, because the Department believes that only three per-
cent of all complaints filed concerning health insurance were due to
late payments. 96 Additionally, providers have been somewhat hesitant
about involving insurance commissioners. Providers fear that requests
for enforcement actions might be detrimental to their practices and
lead to retaliation from third party payors.97 Granting providers a
right of action whereby they can sue managed care companies on their
own behalf reduces the administrative burden on the insurance com-
missioners; reduces the expense of enforcing these state laws, as
fewer parties would be involved; de-politicizes enforcement mecha-
nisms; and most importantly, grants the affected parties status to pur-
sue a statutorily created remedy.
DOES CONTRACT LAW AFFORD PROVIDERS AN
ALTERNATE METHOD TO OBTAIN A REMEDY?
Regardless of whether providers can initiate suits under state
prompt pay statutes, providers can bring claims under breach of con-
tract. Third party payors contract with providers to specify which
medical services will be covered and for what monetary amount those
services will be reimbursed.98 Thus, the argument third party payors
are required to reimburse providers according to the terms of the con-
tract and within a reasonable time makes sense. To maintain a suit
against a third party payor for failure to follow prompt pay statutes,
particularly in a state where a provider does not have a right of action
pursuant to the prompt pay statute, the provider must argue specific
94 Hammond, supra note 7, at 27.
95 Id.
96 Robert Kazel, Insurers Say Prompt Pay Not a Big Issue; Doctors Dis-
agree, AMER. MED. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 17 available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2003/09/15/bisbO915.htm.
97 See Deborah A. Grandinetti, Scoop Up Every Dollar You've Earned,
MED. ECON., Sept. 3, 2001, at 117 ("One more last-ditch resource: the state insurance
commissioner. Savvy billers don't use this until all other remedies have failed, be-
cause they know it can put the practice on the plan's blacklist. Practices that go this
route must be confident that they can document that an insurer has repeatedly delayed
payment without reason, and that they've done everything possible to resolve the
problem.").
98 See generally Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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breaches of contract instead of "underlying policies that would be
applicable to all managed care companies." 99 The provider cannot
simply allege that the third party payor generally fails to reimburse
providers. Providers must allege that the third party payor failed to
abide by the requirements specified in the contract. For example, if a
contract between a provider and a third party payor specifies that the
third party payor will reimburse the provider for services rendered at
X number of dollars within Y number of days, and the third party
payor does not reimburse accordingly, then the provider can allege
breach of contract by the third party payor.
Yet, some courts are unwilling to grant providers relief according
to contract principles. For example, in Solomon v. US Healthcare
Systems of Pennsylvania and Aetna, the court, in discussing contract
interpretation, determined that holding the defendant responsible for
reimbursement within thirty days, when the time frame for reim-
bursement was not specified in the contract, was not a prerequisite to
preventing injustice.100 The court stated,
We observe the well-settled rule that when interpreting a con-
tract, a court must construe it as it is written, giving effect to
the clear language and plain meaning of the words .... [T]he
law is clear that a court 'may imply a missing term in a par-
ties' contract only when it is necessary to prevent injustice
and it is abundantly clear that the parties intended to be bound
by such term.' Appellants have not established that an injus-
tice would be prevented by inserting a 'reasonable time' term
into the parties' agreement, nor are we persuaded that there is
any clear intent by the parties to be bound by such a term.
Moreover, we do not perceive that imposition of a thirty day
time period for payment of claims as suggested by Appellants
99 "In such cases, however, the key issue appears to be that the lawsuit is
attacking underlying policies that would be applicable to all managed care companies,
rather than targeting specific conduct that reflects a breach of duty by a particular
defendant." Hufford, supra note 41, at 496.
100 Solomon v. United States Healthcare Sys. of Pa., 797 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002):
Appellant Dr. Solomon has an agreement with Appellee Aetna, Inc. to pro-
vide certain health care services to Aetna's subscribers, for which Aetna
makes payment .... Appellants commenced this action alleging that Aetna
failed to make payment for medical services rendered according to their
agreement, specifically by improperly denying some claims and unreasona-
bly delaying payment on others.
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is 'essential to a determination of [the parties'] rights and du-
ties. , O1°
The Solomon court indicated that forcing parties that have entered
into a contractual relationship to make payments within a time frame
that is not bargained for in the contract would not prevent injustice. In
Solomon, the contract failed to specify a time frame for reimburse-
ment for medical services provided to the beneficiaries of the defen-
dant. However, Pennsylvania enacted a prompt pay statute that re-
quires managed care entities to reimburse providers for clean claims
within forty-five days of receipt. 10 2 If a managed care entity fails to
submit payment, then ten percent per annum shall be added to the
amount of the claim.'0 3 Although the court found that inserting a
"reasonable time" clause into the contract would not prevent an injus-
tice, the court fails to clarify what a "reasonable time" would be. Pre-
sumably, the time frame of forty-five days created by the Pennsyl-
vania legislature would be reasonable.
In Grider, the court criticized the Solomon decision, which denied
the existence of a private right of action pursuant to state prompt pay
statutes. 104 However, the Grider court dismissed the plaintiff's counts
alleging violation of duty of good faith and fair dealing, stating that
the plaintiffs' claims essentially mirrored their RICO claims."0 5 Thus,
the Grider court reasoned that if the claim alleging violation of a duty
of good faith and fair dealing can be brought under another cause of
action, the courts will be unlikely to recognize a cause of action for
the violation of a duty of good faith and fair dealing. This reasoning
does not indicate that the courts have determined that the violation
does not exist. Instead, the courts are less likely to recognize this
cause of action indicating a preference for causes of action based on
statutory violations, and a preference that the same alleged violations
are brought under one cause of action instead of multiple causes of
action. According one commentator,
[r]elying, at least in part, on a breach of contract theory
should also provide plaintiffs with a means to avoid the ad-
'0' Id. at 349-50. Additionally, "[t]he trial court noted that during the parties'
fifteen year relationship, no specific time period for payment ever developed, nor was
interest ever paid on claims. Certainly the parties' long-standing course of perform-
ance was relevant to a determination of whether the parties intended to impose such
an obligation." Id. at 350.
102 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 991.2166 (West 1999).
103 Id.
104 Grider v. Keystone Health Plan, No. 2001-CV-05641, 2003 U.S. Dist.




verse implications of Pegram and Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 19172 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2000), each of
which dismissed cases brought against managed care compa-
nies for violation of ERISA and [RICO], respectively.
0 6
In light of the Grider case, plaintiffs should ensure that their com-
plaints allege specific violations of contractual provisions in addition
to alleging violations of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, espe-
cially if the violation of a duty of good faith and fair dealing can be
brought under another cause of action. In Batas v. Prudential Insur-
ance, a New York case, the court held that the plaintiffs "base[d] their
contractual claim on allegations that the procedures utilized by defen-
dants were not those promised in their contractual agreements, [and]
[s]uch a claim would not be precluded by the subsequent legisla-
tion" 10 7 and thereby "rejected Prudential's contention that the plain-
tiffs' claims were preempted by state regulations."'10 8 Case law indi-
cates that if plaintiffs can support allegations of specific contract vio-
lations, these causes of action are likely to withstand motions to dis-
miss based on preemption defenses of state legislation and ERISA.'0 9
If providers can maintain causes of action based on breach of con-
tract theory, why should providers be granted a private right of action
pursuant to prompt pay statutes? Enabling providers to have a right of
action to enforce prompt pay statutes not only reinforces the purpose
of the statute, but it also allows for greater continuity regarding the
reimbursement policies and procedures of managed care entities.
WHAT IS A CLEAN CLAIM AND HOW DOES IT
IMPACT TIMELY REIMBURSEMENT?
The fundamental element common to the vast majority of prompt
pay statutes is the requirement of filing clean claims. Clean claims
106 Hufford, supra note 41, at 496 (citation omitted). For another perspective,
see Chesanow, supra note 32, at 31:
"Doctors aren't the only ones crying foul." Richard A. Epstein, a professor
at the University of Chicago Law School, deplores "the effort to try to ele-
vate every ordinary breach-of-contract claim into a criminal or quasi-
criminal offense. That makes it impossible for people to deal with these is-
sues in a responsive fashion. The idea that this would count as racketeering
seems to say in the crudest terms that the guys who are running HMOs are
the blood brothers of Tony Soprano."
107 Batas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 107881/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar.
28, 1999), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/comdiv/Law_20Report_2OFiles/
July_201999/batas.htm.




must be paid within a specific time frame; however, states were not
clear in defining what constitutes a clean claim when these statutes
were first passed. Recently, states and courts have started defining
what constitutes a clean claim. In Pennsylvania, a clean claim is de-
fined as:
[a] claim for payment for a health care service which has no
defect or impropriety. A defect or impropriety shall include
lack of substantiating documentation or a particular circum-
stance requiring special treatment which prevents timely
payment from being made on the claim. The term shall not
include a claim from a health care provider who is under in-
vestigation for fraud or abuse regarding that claim." 
0
In general, a clean claim is a claim that includes customary infor-
mation about the patient and the care provided. Both the federal gov-
ernment and the insurance industry require a claim to provide standard
identifying information such as patient name and date and location of
service for the claim to be considered a clean claim.111 However, am-
biguity still exists in the definition of a clean claim. In the Pennsyl-
vania statutory definition, the terms "substantiating documentation"
and "particular circumstance" are not defined. Consequently, the
terms are subject to differing interpretations based on whether one is a
provider or a payor. Additionally, ambiguity in what constitutes a
clean claim lies in that both commercial insurers' regulations and
Medicaid prompt pay rules "provide that a claim is not clean unless it
contains such additional documentation as is required by the . . .
Health Plan. Thus, a Health Plan has some discretion with respect to
the information it may require for a claim to be clean."' 12 The provi-
sions that allow health plans to determine what is necessary and rele-
vant for a claim to be processed create considerable frustration for
providers as health plans due to the lack of consistency among health
plans as to what constitutes a clean claim. As a result, states are revis-
ing their prompt pay statutes to better define what constitutes a clean
claim or to require payors to publish and provide notice to providers
of what elements are necessary for a claim to be considered clean.
Payors blame the clean claim problem on the lack of technology
implemented into the billing practices of providers. 13 Payors argue
110 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 991.2102 (West 1999).
'1 Hammond, supra note 7, at 26 (citation omitted).
112 Id.
113 See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Prompting Promptness; Fines Mount Against
Seven Insurance Firms For Dragging Feet With Payments, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug.
20, 2001, at 12, 13 ("In a written statement, the insurers' group blamed 'lack of in-
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that if providers would invest in filing claims electronically, problems
with payment timeframes would disappear.1 14  Although electronic
filing of claims might aid in reducing filing errors, the definition of
what constitutes a clean claim remains unanswered. More impor-
tantly, the problem lies in that the definition of a clean claim varies
from one managed care entity to the next. Consequently, providers
are constantly working to ensure that the differing and individual re-
quirements of managed care entities are appropriately satisfied.
SHOULD PROVIDER ADVOCATES HAVE A RIGHT OF
ACTION ON BEHALF OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS?
Provider advocates" 5 should be able to initiate suits on behalf of
their members. Provider advocates have significant power to effect
change, even if courts determine that they should not have standing to
initiate and maintain suits for violation of prompt pay statutes. For
example, the Texas Medical Association (TMA) leads the nation in
ensuring that its constituents are represented and that the Texas
Prompt Pay statute is enforced. The TMA first compelled Texas In-
surance Commissioner Jose Montemayor to realize the consequences
of late payments by inviting him to visit with county medical societies
and by lobbying him to enforce the prompt pay statutes already in
existence. 1 6 In response, Montemayor stated, "I have to say in all
fairness that the TMA had not misrepresented the situation.... 7
Furthermore, Montemayor created four mechanisms by which to en-
force prompt payment.' 8 First, an official was appointed to manage
slow-pay complaints. Second, an online complaint form was created.
Third, prompt-pay workshops were scheduled around the state.
vestment in technological resources by physicians and other providers' for payment
disputes. Lucksinger said, 'A great many of the claims problems we are experiencing
would disappear overnight if physicians would file their claims electronically."').
114 See Kazel, supra note 100, at 17 ("The insurance industry argues that the
increasing number of doctors who've started filing claims electronically over the past
few years has speeded turnaround of claims and made the laws less relevant. And,
they say, their numbers show most claims are processed within legal time limits.")..
See also Jaklevic, supra note 117, at 13.
115 Provider advocates are organizations to which health care providers are
members. These organizations can be general physician organizations, hospital asso-
ciations, or specialty groups. Examples include the American Medical Association,
the Ohio Hospital Association, the Texas Medical Association, and the American
Society of Anesthesiology.
116 Wayne J. Guglielmo, America's Best Medical Society?, MED. ECON., Aug.





Fourth, Montemayor promised that the Texas Insurance Department
would create rules to improve compliance."
9
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the
United States Supreme Court held that
an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its mem-
bers when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit.
20
Whether a provider advocate will have standing to bring suit is
dependent upon the jurisdiction. However, this paper argues that all
providers should have standing to bring suit pursuant to a state's
prompt pay laws. Consequently, the first element of the Hunt test
would be satisfied, if the providers have standing.
The second element of the Hunt test is satisfied since provider ad-
vocates exist to lobby both locally and nationally for their constituents
along the many facets of a provider's practice. Provider advocates
exist not only to further science, ensure quality of care, and to estab-
lish and enforce standards of care, but to also lobby the interests of
their constituents. Also, prompt payment of claims is of primary im-
portance to providers. If any questions exist as to whether the second
prong of the Hunt test is satisfied, the answer should be clearly found
when reviewing the charter and mission statement of the organization
in question. With that determination, granting standing to a provider
advocate would reduce the administrative burden on the courts and on
states' Departments of Insurance, as provider advocates would be
better able to consolidate caseloads and organize lawsuits against spe-
cific managed care organizations suspected of violating prompt pay
laws.' 2' Additionally, allowing provider advocates to litigate these
suits would increase the likelihood that cases are brought that other-
wise might not be, due to either the fear of retribution by the managed
119 Id.
120 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
See also Hufford, supra note 41, at 506.
121 See Chesanow, supra note 32, at 35:
[t]he groups, which have a combined membership of nearly 90,000, hope to
underscore physicians' problems with managed care. 'The HMOs say that
our evidence is anecdotal and isolated and only represents 15 or 50 clients,'
says Lamb. 'But with the Georgia, Texas, and California medical groups




care organization or because of insufficient financial resources to ini-
tiate and sustain an action against a managed care organization.
The third prong of the Hunt test creates difficulty in terms of how
much force an action by a provider advocate would have. The third
prong states that the participation of an individual member should not
be required with respect to the claim asserted or the relief re-
quested. 22 Arguably, if monetary damages are included in the re-
quested relief, then it is likely that provider advocates would not be
able to bring claims independent of their constituents. However,
prompt pay laws typically delineate the relief available - payment of
the claim plus interest for the lateness. 123 Because the relief that can
be requested is limited to statutory requirements, provider advocates
should be able to satisfy the third element of the Hunt test and main-
tain the claims independently of their constituents. Provider advo-
cates would not file causes of action requesting damages; the sole
restitution requested would be that outlined in the prompt pay statute.
However, for a provider advocate to bring the claim, constituents
would have to file some type of report with the provider advocate
declaring the violation and providing the advocate with sufficient
proof that the violation occurred.
If courts determine that provider advocates have standing to bring
claims but not without the direct involvement of constituents if mone-
tary damages are desired, then provider advocates should focus their
claims on injunctive or declaratory relief.124 In this event, provider
advocates need to establish that the suit is intended to bring about
relief that would compel payors "to alter their pattern and practice of
conduct, not that they seek monetary recoveries for their members" in
order for their suits to survive motions to dismiss. 25 In this event,
providers either would have to join the provider advocate's suit or
initiate a suit independent of that of the advocate in order to request
payment plus interest. However, in the long term, suits brought by
provider advocates are more likely to effectively and positively
change the claims payment policies of managed care entities and to
force state insurance departments to enforce prompt pay legislation
due to the power held by provider advocates.
122 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
123 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 991.2166 (West 1999).
124 Hufford, supra note 21, at 506 (discussing forms of relief available to an
association of health care providers when members are not able to participate in the
suit).
125 Id. at 507.
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CONSEQUENCES OF PLACING ENFORCEMENT OF
PROMPT PAY STATUTES WITH THE STATE
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
Lastly, this paper explores the practicality of the current system of
placing responsibility for enforcement of prompt pay statutes with
state insurance commissioners through administrative actions in the
context of cost to the health care industry, incentive to payors to fol-
low prompt pay statutes, and likelihood that insurance commissioners
will enforce these statutes. The effectiveness of this system is largely
determined by the willingness and the ability of a state insurance
commissioner to enforce prompt pay statutes. Few state insurance
commissioners have been proactive in enforcing prompt pay legisla-
tion by fining payors for violations and by forcing payment. 126 To
create a system whereby prompt pay legislation is continually en-
forced, regardless of the desire or ability of an insurance commis-
sioner and regardless of changes of personnel within state insurance
departments, prompt pay legislation should be interpreted to include a
private right of action for providers to enforce timely reimbursement.
Healthcare in America constitutes approximately fourteen percent
of the gross domestic product. 127 Frequent discussions take place
across the United States about the cost of a physician visit, the cost of
a hospital stay, and the cost of healthcare in general. When healthcare
providers are not reimbursed timely and appropriately, the cost of
financing their receivables increases and affects their ability to pro-
vide care. As previously mentioned, many providers have had to
close their doors because of insufficient funds due to untimely and
inadequate payment by third party payors, causing much disruption in
care, confusion about care, lower quality of care, and inadequate ac-
cess to care.1 28 Prompt pay statutes were created to help address these
problems. If providers were paid on a timely basis and with appropri-
ate reimbursement, then many of these negative consequences would
be lessened if not significantly reduced. However, placing enforce-
ment of these statutes with an entity that may not enforce the law in a
particular case and barring those who desire enforcement from initiat-
ing and maintaining causes of action pursuant to the statutes effec-
tively nullifies the validity and purpose of the statutes. Additionally,
by increasing the number of parties required to enforce the statute,
126 See Appendix at 42.
127 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, HEALTH CARE COSTS,
AHRQ PuB. No. 02-P033, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/
costsfact.htm.
128 See Mittler, supra note 12, at 564.
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(i.e., by adding an insurance commissioner into the mix) the cost of
enforcement increases; consequently, increasing the cost of care. 129
Placing the responsibility for enforcement of prompt pay statutes
with state insurance commissioners creates the likelihood that prompt
pay enforcement will become politicized and based upon total quanti-
ties of dollars not paid pursuant to the statute, instead of whether or
not a violation occurred. Consequently, payors may not have suffi-
cient incentives to change their payment practices to avoid these fines.
Moreover, if the sole enforcement mechanism of state prompt pay
statutes resides with state insurance commissioners, providers are
essentially without reparation for the damages caused by late pay-
ments. However, providers are not without power to compel insur-
ance commissioners to review the problems caused by late or no pay-
ments. For example, the Texas Medical Association essentially
forced Insurance Commissioner Montemayer to look into and address
the failure of managed care organizations to make timely and appro-
priate payments. Consequently, Texas has led the nation in imposing
significant fines totaling more than thirty-six million dollars against
managed care entities for violations.
1 30
Granting a private right of action to providers will result in an in-
creased caseload for an already overburdened judicial system; how-
ever, with clear legislative guidelines disposition of cases should be
relatively straightforward. Prompt pay statutes revolve around the
clean claim doctrine. Since the term "clean claim" remains highly
ambiguous, courts will not be able to rubberstamp a case and say that
a payor has violated or not violated the statute. Until the issue of what
exactly constitutes a clean claim is resolved and clearly defined by
legislatures, courts will remain disinclined to litigants who bring these
types of cases.
The most promising solution is for provider advocates to assert
their collective power and force state legislatures to clearly define
what constitutes a clean claim and to explicitly create a private right
of action for providers and provider advocates. With the ambiguity of
what constitutes a clean claim removed, courts would easily be able to
review whether a managed care entity violated a prompt pay statute
by failing to reimburse providers within the statutorily created time
frame. Creating clear rules would eliminate economic imbalances that
129 See Jaklevic, supra note 117, at 13:
"The true cost of these penalties and restitution, in terms of a higher cost of
healthcare, is ultimately going to be paid by businesses and consumers in
the state of Texas," said Tom Lucksinger, president of the Texas Associa-
tion of Health Plans. Lucksinger is president and chief executive officer of
Houston-based Am Care Health Plans.
130 Appendix infra p. 233.
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enable a managed care entity to keep a suit in litigation until a pro-
vider runs out of resources. Furthermore, provider advocates are more
likely to track which managed care entities more egregiously violate
prompt pay statutes. Removing sole enforcement responsibility from
a state insurance commissioner and placing responsibility with the
affected parties creates a system whereby enforcement is more likely
to be sought.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs face the challenge of persuading courts that prompt pay
issues are appropriate for courts because of the expertise courts hold
in assessing "contractual and statutory duties and obligations."',
31
Michigan's prompt pay statutes are a positive sign for health care pro-
viders; however, the insurance commissioner will play a large role in
the effectiveness of the statute.1 32  Of the states that have passed
prompt pay statutes, only fourteen have Departments of Insurance
which have enforced the prompt pay statute and imposed fines, re-
quired payment plus interest, or both.' 33 The monies paid in these
states total over fifty-one million dollars. 34 It is difficult to imagine
that with fourteen states imposing fines and restitution worth this
amount of money, that prompt payment is not an issue for the remain-
ing states. Additionally, it is easy to see that providers are filing
bankruptcy because of late payments. If providers have a right of
action to maintain a suit attempting to enforce prompt payment for
claims, the quantity of dollars spent in fines and restitution will in-
crease initially, but will drop off after payors begin to follow prompt
pay statutes by paying a claim, denying a claim, or questioning a
claim within the statutorily allotted time frame. Regardless of how
the courts decide to rule on provider right of action over the next sev-
eral years, providers can sustain suits alleging contractual violations
131 Hufford, supra note 41, at 497.
132 See Hammond, supra note 7, at 27:
[w]hile Michigan's prompt pay statutes definitely represent a step in the
right direction for health care providers, the effectiveness of these statutes
will depend, in large part, upon the manner in which complaints are handled
by the Commissioner of the Office of Insurance and Financial Services.
Swift and decisive action by the commissioner, including the imposition of
substantial penalties, as have been seen in other states, will ensure that the
law has enough 'teeth' to be effective. If on the other hand, these statutes
do nothing more than convert the time providers wait for third-party payors
to pay claims into time spent waiting for the commissioner to enforce the
rules, these statutes may largely be viewed as ineffective.
133 See Appendix infra p. 231.
134 Id. at 234.
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without fear of ERISA preemption. Yet, suits alleging breach of con-
tract will not be as effective in changing the reimbursement policies
and practices of managed care entities as suits alleging violation of
state prompt pay statutes.
State legislatures should create a statutory right of action for pro-
viders pursuant to prompt pay statutes. Additionally, provider advo-
cates should be able to initiate and sustain causes of action on behalf
of their constituents pursuant to this right of action. Provider advo-
cates should use the considerable power they hold to compel state
insurance commissioners to recognize the claims payment problems
that, as stated in the paper, have detrimental consequences on the
quality of care and availability of care provided to beneficiaries of
managed care organizations. Until state legislatures create an explicit
statutory right of action, courts should determine that effective en-
forcement of prompt pay statutes will only occur if the courts find an
implied right of action allowing providers to enforce timely reim-
bursement for services pursuant to state prompt pay statutes.
APPENDIX
State Prompt Pay Statutes Comparisons And Penalties Imposed
PENALTIES/
STATE PAYMENT TIMEFRAMES PENALTY RESTITUTION/
INTEREST
HMOs: 45 working days
AL Health insurance pending: 1.5% per month $224,600
30 working days for elec-
tronic; 35 for paper
Paper: 20 working days; <$250: 5% payment or
AK Electronic: 10 working $5, whichever is less;
days > $250: 2% of payment
AZ All claims types: 30 days Legal interest rate
after claim approved Leaitrstrt
Paper: 45 calendar days
AR Electronic: 30 calendar 12% annually
days
Non-HMOs: 30 working 15% annually; $10 add'l
CA days non-inclusion of interest $3,801,500
HMOs: 45 working days with payment
All claim types: 45 working 10% annually; >90 days $141,750
days 3% claim amount





STATE PAYMENT TIMEFRAMES PENALTY RESTITUTION/
INTEREST
All claim types: 30 working Maximum allowable
days lending rate
All claim types: 30 working 1.5%: 31-60 days
DC A aim 2%: 61-120 days
days 2.5% thereafter
HMO claims: 35 days
Fl Non-HMO claims: 45 days 10% annually $984,000Claim requesting additional
information: 120 days
GA All claim types: 15 working 18% annually $1,705,779
days
HI Paper: 30 days 15% annually; fines
Electronic: 15 days may also be assessed
ID All claim types: 30 working Legal rate ofinterest
ID___ days, effective 7/31/2003 Legal rate of interest
All claim types: 30 days
IL All insurers must change 9% annually
contract for compliance
with state law
IN All claim types: 45 days 6% annually 2001-02;
4% annually 2003
Same as time for group
health plans established by
IA the USDOL pursuant to 29 10% annually
CFR pt. 2560 in effect on
.1/1/2002.
KS All claim types: 30 days 1% annually
12% annually if 31-60
KY All claim types: 30 days to days; 18% annually ifpay or deny 61-90 days; 21% over
90 days
1% of unpaid balance;Paper: submitted within 45 add'l 1% penalty added
LA days + 45 days to pay for each 25 days re-
Electronic: 25 days mains unpaid
ME All claim types: 30 days 1.5% per month $3,365,000
1.5% per month 31-60
MD All claim types: 30 days days; 2% per month 61- $2,675,000120 days; 2.5% per
month over 121 days
MA All claim types: 45 days 1.5% per month
after receipt
MI Non-contracted providers: 12% annually
60 days
MN All claim types: 30 days 1.5% per month
Paper: 35 days
M_ Electronic: 25 days 1.5% per month
All claim types: 30 days for 1% per month $100,160




STATE PAYMENT TIMEFRAMES PENALTY RESTITUTION/
INTEREST
MT All claim types: 30 days 18% annually
All claim types: within 15
NE days of receipt acknowl- None listed
edgment
Refer to state code
NV All claim types: 30 days 99.040 or provider con-
I tract
NH Paper: 45 daysElectronic: 15 days 1.5% monthly
NJ Paper: 40 days 10% annually
N Electronic: 30 days 10%_annually
NM Paper: 45 days
Electronic: 30 days 1.5% monthly
Current, all claim types: 45
days Current: 12% annually
NY Pending: paper, 30 days; Pending: 2% of claim $8,263,000
electronic, 15 days (pro- amount
posed 3/2002)
All claim types: 30 days for 18% annually $545,000
payment or denial
ND All claim types: 15 days None given
OH All claim types: 30 days 12% annually
10% annually
OK All claim types: 45 days >6 interest rate same as
US rate
OR All claim types: 30 days 12% annually
PA All claim types: 45 days 10% annually
RI All claims: 30 days 12% annually
Paper: 45 days
SC Electronic: 30 days 6% annually
1 (effective 7/1/2003)
SD Paper: 45 days None indicated
Electronic: 30 days
TN Paper: 30 days 1% monthly
Electronic: 21 days
TX HMOs only: 45 days 18% annually $29,350,020*
All claim types: 30 days for May be applied accord-
UT payment or denial ing to formula
VT All claim types: 45 days 12% annually
VA All claim types: 45 days Daily legal rate of inter-
est
90% monthly volume: 30
WA days; 90% monthly volume: I% monthly $305,000payment or denial in 60
days
WV Paper: 40 days 10% annuallyElectronic: 30 days
WI All claim types: 30 days 12% annually
WY All claim types: 45 days 10% annually
2005]
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Total Fines, Penalties, and Restitution (approximately) $51,534.059
# Estimates are that outstanding claims remain in the millions.
* Data not complete, reports indicate that over $36 million in restitution
has been paid to providers.
+ This chart, current January 2004, was compiled from charts published
by various authors. See DON SELF & ASSOCIATES, INC., PROMPT PAY LAWS
BY STATE, available at http://www.donself.com/
documents/prompt-pay.doc (last visited January 3, 2004); AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROMPT PAYMENT FINES, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/368/fineschart_804.pdf (last
visited January 11, 2004); KAREN ZUPKO & ASSOCIATES, INC., PROMPT PAY
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, available at http://www.karenzupko.com/
Resources/toolsiDownloads/prompt%20pay%202003.doc (last visited De-
cember 29, 2003).
